Copyright 2021 by Eleanor Brown & June Carbone
Northwestern University Law Review

Vol. 116

RACE, PROPERTY, AND CITIZENSHIP
Eleanor Brown and June Carbone
ABSTRACT—The racial wealth gap is stunning. The net worth of an average
White family is nearly ten times greater than that of an African-American
family. A 2017 Prosperity Now report finds that for African-Americans,
today’s economy is an extractive one; if existing trends continue, the median
African-American family will have a net worth of zero by the middle of the
twenty-first century. This Essay examines these trends in terms of the
relationship between race, property, and citizenship. American democracy
has long celebrated economic independence as a desired element of
citizenship, forging reciprocal bonds between state efforts to promote and
protect property ownership and property owners’ greater investment in
community and political stability. African-Americans have long been
excluded from these benefits and, in the process, have never fully enjoyed
the benefits of American citizenship that comes with political clout. The
result creates increased vulnerability, not just to White supremacy, but to
economic exploitation. The lack of political clout contributes to lax
regulation and enforcement of lending laws, which allow racially motivated
predators to act with impunity, undermining the rule of law and perpetuating
racial subordination. In the modern era, this predation has made home
ownership, higher education loans, and marriage—the traditional pathways
into middle-class status—dramatically riskier for African-Americans than
for Whites.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, property ownership and citizenship have long been
linked and long served to deny African-Americans full participation in
American life. The colonies, like Great Britain, limited the right to vote to
White male property owners. 1 They believed that “[p]roperty supplied
independence; those without property were presumed to be economically
dependent on and subservient to others.”2 Through the end of the Civil War,
however, the vast majority of African-Americans in the United States were
property,3 and many states limited the ability not only of enslaved people4
but also of formerly enslaved people to own property within the state.5 Even
after slavery ended, African-Americans were denied the opportunity to

1
By the middle of the eighteenth century, all American colonies except South Carolina had adopted
election laws which denied the franchise to those who owned no property. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property
and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (1989).
2
Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1509 (2002).
3
Roy W. Copeland, The Nomenclature of Enslaved Africans as Real Property or Chattels Personal:
Legal Fiction, Judicial Interpretation, Legislative Designation, or Was a Slave a Slave by Any Other
Name, 40 J. BLACK STUD. 946, 946 (2010) (discussing judicial and legislative acts that considered slaves
as property). In 1790, there were almost 700,000 enslaved African-Americans in the United States,
constituting eighteen percent of the population. By 1860, there were 4 million enslaved AfricanAmericans in the South, compared to less than half a million free African-Americans in the country as a
whole. Aaron O’Neill, Black and Slave Population in the United States 1790–1880, STATISTA (Mar. 19,
2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1010169/black-and-slave-population-us-1790-1880 [https://
perma.cc/2QPY-29WR].
4
See, e.g., Lea v. Brown, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 141, 141 (1857) (“A bequest of two hundred acres
of land and three thousand dollars . . . with a provision that on the death or insolvency of the legatee, one
of the slaves should select an owner . . . is manifestly for the ease and benefit of the slaves and against
the public policy.”).
5
See, e.g., Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 842–44 (1838) (invalidating bequest to
formerly enslaved African-Americans because they continued to live in the state). Other states that did
not prohibit property ownership altogether made it difficult for Whites to transfer property to unmarried
partners and children. Bernie D. Jones, “Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable Old Men,” and “Degraded
Creatures”: Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV. 699,
743 (2005) (describing cases that involved informal transfers, bequests, and inter vivos conveyances that
testators challenged as fraudulent or against public policy because of the unmarried nature of the
relationships). But see Le Grand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 664, 670 (1829) (upholding bequest in
Maryland, a state that did not prohibit transfers to African-Americans).
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acquire the kind of property that allows for economic security and
independence.6 This legacy continues to this day—not just as a product of
the continuing consequences of slavery, but also as a cause and consequence
of the lack of political clout granted to African-Americans. Even when
African-Americans have the ability to acquire property and other assets, they
do not necessarily have the ability to realize the fruits of such investments.
The result increases American economic inequality more generally, with
particularly devastating effects on minority communities.
This Essay examines the continuing role of racial wealth disparities in
the lack of access to full citizenship. Racial disparities in wealth are
substantially greater than disparities in income.7 Between 1983 and 2013, the
accumulated assets of median African-American households decreased by
75% (Latino households by 50%),8 and a 2017 report found that if present
trends continue, the median African-American household will have a net
worth of zero by 2053.9 These patterns contribute to disparities not just in
economic independence and well-being, but also in families’ abilities to
manage their investments in human capital (e.g., education) and physical
capital (e.g., land) that provide pathways for upward mobility.10 The results
deny racial minorities an ownership stake in American society and make
their efforts to acquire middle-class status far more perilous than for Whites.
In Part I, this Essay discusses the close relationship between full
citizenship and property ownership and how lack of property ownership has
denied African-Americans standing in the American polity. The historical
marginalization of African-American communities that began with slavery
continues today. Part II then examines three factors that have continued to
reduce overall minority equity across three traditional pathways for upward
mobility: home ownership, higher education, and marriage. First, the most

6
See Roy W. Copeland, In the Beginning: Origins of African American Real Property Ownership in
the United States, 44 J. BLACK STUD. 646, 656–57 (2013) (discussing both de jure and de facto barriers
to African-American land ownership following Emancipation).
7
In 2020, Whites had a net worth of ten times that of African-Americans. Kriston McIntosh, Emily
Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-White-wealth-gap
[https://perma.cc/3RCY-MSM9].
8
DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, CHUCK COLLINS, JOSH HOXIE & EMANUEL NIEVES, PROSPERITY
NOW, THE ROAD TO ZERO WEALTH: HOW THE RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE IS HOLLOWING OUT AMERICA’S
MIDDLE CLASS 8 (2017), https://prosperitynow.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/road_to_zero_wealth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3893-8MMC].
9
Id. at 12.
10
The traditional pathways into middle-class status have been home ownership and other capital
investments; the acquisition of greater human capital, primarily through higher education; and marriage,
which combines two family networks to transfer material and emotional assets across generations. See
infra Part II.
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dramatic decline in minority wealth stems from the lingering effects of the
2008 financial crisis where an American housing bubble (fueled at least
partly by fraud) burst, contributing to a financial crisis. The financial crisis
was fueled in part by the practices of predatory lenders who deliberately
targeted minority communities. 11 Second, student loan debt has
disproportionately burdened African-Americans. At college graduation,
African-American graduates owe almost 50% more than Whites, and that
gap more than triples on average over the years immediately following
graduation. 12 Part of the reason for the gap is that aggressive lending
practices at for-profit universities are much more likely to victimize AfricanAmericans than others. Another reason is that African-Americans enjoy less
of an increase in income than Whites from the acquisition of degrees. Third,
these disparities increase family instability in ways that undermine marriage
and increase wariness about a commitment to a partner who may be more of
a financial liability than an asset in managing a household.
In each of these cases, intentional public policies—the refusal to rein in
predatory lending practices, the underfunding of public universities, and the
encouragement of for-profit universities as an alternative—exacerbate the
racial disparities. 13 To make matters worse, policymakers pushing freemarket policies have used racial disparities to blame victims.14 Vilification
of homeowners who borrowed more than they could afford to pay back, for
example, persuaded the Obama Administration to limit the assistance it
provided to underwater homeowners—homeowners with mortgages
exceeding the market value of their homes—even as the Administration

11

See, e.g., Jacob W. Faber, Racial Dynamics of Subprime Mortgage Lending at the Peak, 23 HOUS.
POL’Y DEBATE 328, 331 (2013) (describing how lenders increased the availability of credit to “blacks,
Latinos, and other previously excluded groups, but in the form of higher cost and riskier subprime
credit”); see generally KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL
ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019) (using the term “predatory inclusion”
to describe the policies that made African-American homeowners targets for predatory practices).
12
JUDITH SCOTT-CLAYTON & JING LI, BROOKINGS INST., BLACK-WHITE DISPARITY IN STUDENT
LOAN DEBT MORE THAN TRIPLES AFTER GRADUATION 1 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research
/black-White-disparity-in-student-loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation [https://perma.cc/WK64JSTP].
13
See infra Part II. The tax system also magnifies the disparities. See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN,
THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW
WE CAN FIX IT (2021) (discussing how the tax system has consistently provided disproportionate
advantages to Whites).
14
andré douglas pond cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market Crisis, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 141, 147 (2011). See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, LET THEM EAT TWEETS: HOW
THE RIGHT RULES IN AN AGE OF EXTREME INEQUALITY (2020) (arguing that the political right maintains
support for unpopular economic policies that allow the concentration of wealth by, among other things,
stoking racial resentment).
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bailed out large Wall Street banks and refused to prosecute the bankers
responsible for these practices.15
This Essay concludes that the concept of citizenship involves mutually
reinforcing practices. Achieving the economic independence that comes with
property ownership and investment enhances the qualities associated with
responsible citizenship. 16 Yet, real citizenship—including acquisition of
some significant measure of political clout—also creates the ability to protect
property investments and make them worthwhile. Truly confronting racial
inequality, therefore, requires seeing these developments in mutually
reinforcing terms.

I. PROPERTY, CITIZENSHIP, AND POLITICAL POWER
American independence, while celebrated as a triumph for democracy,
also came with wariness about the precarious nature of democratic
governance.17 The Founders thought that the prospects for democracy were
best served by the existence of a large middle group that would promote a
stable society. 18 They distrusted both concentrated elite power and the
judgment of the masses who lacked a stake in the stability and prosperity of
the country.19 In both cases, they feared that unaccountable power would
corrupt democracy and that a widespread investment stake could align
political and economic interests in mutually reinforcing ways.20
In denying the right to vote to the propertyless (and therefore women,
non-Whites, servants, and those enslaved), colonial leaders expressed
concern that the powerful, who supplied the economic well-being of the
dependent, would also command the votes of those dependent on such
largess, magnifying and entrenching the advantages associated with

15

See, e.g., David Lawder, Bailout Watchdogs Slam Obama Housing Programs, REUTERS (July 20,
2010, 10:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bailout-support-idUSTRE66K0I520100721
[https://perma.cc/NM4V-ES9Q] (explaining how Obama-era housing programs were criticized for
bailing out banks and failing to prevent home foreclosures efficiently).
16
See infra Part I.
17
See, e.g., JAMES BRYANT CONANT, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
PUBLIC EDUCATION 37 (1962) (emphasizing the importance of education to counter the attractiveness of
demagogic appeals to the illiterate masses); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985) (observing that “the ‘corruption’ that created factions as a natural,
though undesirable, product of liberty and inequality in human faculties” presents a threat to democracy).
18
See, e.g., Steinfeld, supra note 1, at 357–58, 358 n.71 (describing the rationale for limiting the
franchise to property owners in such terms).
19
See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 104 (2017) (describing Madison’s conviction that
the American democracy depended on the broad distribution of land ownership).
20
See supra notes 16–17, infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
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wealth. 21 In accordance with these views, property owners had both a
measure of autonomy and a lasting identification with the “destiny of the
country.”22 In contrast, James Madison warned against “the transient, often
imprudent, and almost always tyrannical nature of an impassioned majority”
that could give rise to ill-considered factions.23
The alternative view, often identified with Thomas Jefferson and other
civic republicans, saw promoting conditions that gave rise to a more robust
middle group 24 as the solution to unaccountable power threatening
democracy. The critical factor was not the restriction of the right to vote, but
the strength of the economic center. Brazilian economist Eduardo Giannetti
da Fonseca has defined the middle class in modern terms as “people who are
not resigned to a life of poverty, who are prepared to make sacrifices to create
a better life for themselves but who have not started with life’s material
problems solved because they have material assets to make their lives
easy.” 25 Giannetti da Fonseca’s emphasis, paralleling the concerns of the
Founders, involves a middle group who, on the one hand, are not so wealthy
that they can rig the system to ensure the success of themselves and their
children, but, on the other hand, are still capable of producing enough of a
surplus to invest in the future.
This conception of a center that was willing to take risks but at the same
time promote stability resonated with the civic republican views of the
Founders. At the time of the country’s founding, civic republicans associated
property ownership, which granted some independence, with an alignment
of interests between citizens and polity and with the promotion of civic
virtue. 26 Madison and Jefferson, for example, favored relative economic
21
See Steinfeld, supra note 1, at 340–41; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1552 (1988).
22
Steinfeld, supra note 1, at 358 n.71.
23
J. Michael Marshall, Close Encounters of the Referendum Kind, 84 FLA. BAR J. 56, 56–57 (2010)
(citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 63 (James Madison)).
24
See Letter for the National Gazette (Jan. 23, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196,
197–98 (Robert A. Rutland, Thomas A. Mason, Robert J. Brugger, Jeanne K. Sisson & Fredrika J. Teute
eds., 1983).
25
JOHN PARKER, ECONOMIST, BURGEONING BOURGEOISIE: A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE NEW
MIDDLE CLASSES IN EMERGING MARKETS 1 (2009), https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/
special-reports-pdfs/13092764.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RZ9-Z5PK].
26
Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 273, 286 (1991); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,
331–33 (1996) (noting that the Framers considered property rights highly important in establishing a
liberal constitutional order). In line with these views, the Founders promoted protection of broadly
distributed property rights. Alexander, supra, at 291; Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law:
Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (2006) (noting the
historical ties between early American views of the importance of broadly based property rights and

125

NORTHWESTERNUNIVERSITYLAWREVIEWONLINE

independence as well as political equality27 and believed that a well-educated
citizenry would be more resistant to demagogic appeals.28
The experience of African-Americans in the United States serves as
counterpoint to every aspect of this account. At the time of the country’s
founding, the vast majority of African-Americans were enslaved—treated as
property, denied the right to vote and to own property, and viewed as
incapable of full citizenship. Those who favored the use of state efforts to
promote a stable middle class to provide a ballast for American society could
not have seen African-Americans (who were overwhelmingly enslaved) as
appropriate candidates for that investment.29 Those who feared the rabble—
a propertyless majority perceived as having little stake in the country—
readily assigned African-Americans to that group. 30 And the legacy of
slavery left too many African-Americans without property—the
“ownership” state of the kind that the Founders envisioned was illusory.31
The historic African-American exclusion from an economically
independent middle class creates a pincer movement. On the one hand, a
history of economic predators stripping African-Americans of property
rights with impunity prevents the accumulation of the physical, social, and

Republican political ideals). But see Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 5 (1991) (noting that despite the prioritization of property rights, much of early American real property
was forcibly taken from Native Americans).
27
See Letter for the National Gazette, supra note 24, at 197–98.
28
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1786), in CONANT, supra
note 17, app. III, at 98 (describing Jefferson’s emphasis on the importance of education to a democracy).
29
Development economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson describe the South, both before
and after the Civil War, as an “extractive” economy designed to transfer wealth to a relatively small elite
“plantocracy.” DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 351–57 (2012). In extractive societies, the associated political and
legal institutions neither protect the property rights of the average person nor constrain elite power. Daron
Acemoglu, Root Causes: A Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of Institutions in Economic
Development, 40 FIN. & DEV. 27, 28 (2003). During the early years of Reconstruction, General Sherman’s
promise to provide formerly enslaved African-Americans with “forty acres and a mule” offered the hope
of breaking the back of the South’s extractive economic institutions by setting up a propertied class
independent of the Southern White plantation elite. But once Sherman’s field order was revoked and the
land returned to the plantation owners, the hope of genuine political and economic transformation—and
full citizenship for African-Americans—died with it. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra, at 357.
30
See, e.g., Willis v. Jolliffe, 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 447, 455–56 (1860) (explaining the likely
political instability that Emancipation would create); Atwood’s Heirs v. Beck, 21 Ala. 590, 615–16
(1852) (speculating that an increase in the number of free Blacks in neighboring states might destabilize
slavery).
31
ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 357 (“The vicious circle is based on extractive political
institutions creating extractive economic institutions, which in turn support the extractive political
institutions, because economic wealth and power buy political power.”); see also Thomas W. Mitchell,
From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence,
and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 511–23
(2001).
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political capital necessary to assert political power. On the other hand, the
absence of political power makes it difficult to limit the predatory behavior.
The inevitable consequence of such a regime is not just the impoverishment
of African-American communities but their political marginalization. The
predatory behavior prevents these communities from accumulating surpluses
that would otherwise allow for investment in the future. Moreover, those
benefitting from this unjust system view any attempt by African-American
communities to buck the political or economic status quo as a threat. Thus,
African-American communities become frozen outside the group that
matters in the construction of the American polity.
II. PREDATORS, PROPERTY, AND DISINVESTMENT
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Civil Rights Movement
sought to dismantle Jim Crow restrictions and enforce equal rights across the
board. 32 During the same period, African-Americans strove to become
members of an economically prosperous middle class.33 As this Essay will
chronicle, the markers of middle-class status had become investment in
home ownership,34 education,35 and marriage.36 Each marker corresponds to
da Fonseca’s notions of middle-class status involving the ability to produce
enough of a surplus to support investment for the future.37 Striving for each
of these markers also entailed real risks.38 By the turn of the twenty-first
century, African-American investors also faced a renewed threat from

32

ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 357.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Durant, Jr. & Joyce S. Louden, The Black Middle Class in America: Historical
and Contemporary Perspectives, 47 PHYLON 253, 255–56 (1986) (describing the emergence of a much
larger and more visible African-American middle class between 1950 and 1980, corresponding to an
increase in education and movement into white-collar occupations).
34
Id. at 261.
35
See infra Section II.B.
36
See infra Section II.C.
37
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
38
Investment involves sinking resources into a capital asset (property ownership, human capital
investment in education, relationships) with the expectation of a future payoff. See infra Sections II.A–
II.C. This Essay focuses on housing, debt-financed education, and marriage because these three
investments simultaneously have been viewed as the hallmarks of middle-class status, have been the
subject of predatory practices that increase household vulnerability, and have triggered “blame-thevictim” criticism that suggests that the victims are responsible for their own fate. Additionally, although
stock market investments produce dramatically greater returns than investments in housing and are also
subject to substantial racial disparities, substantially lower rates of African-American participate in such
investment than White investors. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka & Chidera Oku, Black Retirement Security in
the Era of Defined Contribution Plans: Why African Americans Need to Invest More in Stocks to Generate
the Savings They Need for a Comfortable Retirement, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 173 (2017).
33
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predators, particularly predators who targeted the politically marginalized.39
These predatory behaviors further discouraged African-Americans from
investing in the three markers of full citizenship and middle-class status.
Today, these developments threaten the gains that African-Americans made
during the Civil Rights Era and again threaten the possibility of full
participation in American life.
A. Home Ownership
1. The Ideal
As a marker of full citizenship and middle-class investment, home
ownership remains a potent symbol.40 Precisely because property is hard to
transfer, it constitutes a commitment to the community, the state, and the
country.41 While property ownership as a precondition for civic participation
faded with the Industrial Revolution, the idea that some residents who own
property may have a greater stake in community well-being than others
remains.42 In this sense, responsible citizenship is still associated with an
ownership stake in the well-being of society.
Home ownership has historically been seen as a critical part of the
“American Dream,” contributing to economic security and civic virtue. 43
Homeowners have been described as financially independent citizens who
embody the “core American values of individual freedom, personal
responsibility and self-reliance.”44 Rising home values allow homeowners to
share in the benefits of economic growth,45 and home ownership—at least if
39
Many of the practices we describe result from financial deregulation, which has increased the
opportunities for predatory practices. See William K. Black, The Department of Justice “Chases Mice
While Lions Roam the Campsite”: Why the Department Has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds that
Drove the Financial Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987, 993 (2012); JANIS SARRA & CHERYL L. WADE,
PREDATORY LENDING AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN DREAM 1–2 (2020). Cf.
Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and
Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 859 (2011) (arguing that “the subprime crisis is merely one of a
long and striking list of episodes of involuntary divestment from ownership of minority property
owners”).
40
See Jared Ruiz Bybee, In Defense of Low-Income Homeownership, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
107, 138 (2013).
41
See id. (contrasting the dangers of absentee ownership with ownership by community residents).
42
Indeed, many today continue to see majoritarian preferences as “formed against the backdrop of
disparities in power and limitations in both opportunities and information.” Sunstein, supra note 21, at
1544.
43
A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a
Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189–90 (2009).
44
Id. at 190 (quoting Press Release, The White House, National Homeownership Month, 2005 (May
25, 2005), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050525-14.html
[https://perma.cc/48SQ-2Q2Y]).
45
Id. at 192.
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the homeowner has significant equity in the property—can provide a
measure of economic security.46
For these reasons, the federal government, as it promoted the creation
of a strong middle class in mid-century America, encouraged home
ownership through subsidization and other interventions that supported and
stabilized the housing and mortgage markets.47 Government agencies also
contributed to the development of the thirty-year fixed mortgage and created
incentives that increased mortgage lending.48
2. Race and Reality
While the government undertook extensive efforts to promote
homeownership, it almost simultaneously took steps to exclude AfricanAmericans. In The Color of Law, Richard Rothstein describes the Federal
Housing Administration’s (FHA’s) efforts to promote segregation. 49 The
FHA pioneered a policy called “redlining,” which refused to insure
mortgages in and near African-American neighborhoods. 50 It also
encouraged the creation of racially restrictive covenants and channeled
greater resources to communities that adopted them.51 While subsidizing the
creation of entire subdivisions for Whites, it provided little funding for
African-American neighborhoods and at times mandated that the homes in
better-off communities not be sold to African-Americans.52
The exclusion of African-Americans from federal mortgage efforts
made them more vulnerable to predatory lending practices. In Chicago in
particular, African-Americans relied heavily on contract lending to purchase
homes.53 Contract lending differed from conventional mortgage loans in that
they involved large down payments, monthly payments at high-interest

46

Id. at 191.
Id. at 193.
48
See Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 154 (2009).
49
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 63–67 (2017).
50
Terry Gross, A ‘Forgotten History’ of How the U.S. Government Segregated America, NPR (May
3, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-how-the-u-sgovernment-segregated-america [https://perma.cc/JMF2-WNGX].
51
Lisa Rice, Long Before Redlining: Racial Disparities in Homeownership Need Intentional
Policies, SHELTERFORCE (Feb. 15, 2019), https://shelterforce.org/2019/02/15/long-before-redliningracial-disparities-in-homeownership-need-intentional-policies/ [https://perma.cc/LMB7-6KSB].
52
See J. William Callison, From the Reading Room, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 5,
10 (2017) (reviewing ROTHSTEIN, supra note 49).
53
Natalie Moore, Contract Buying Robbed Black Families in Chicago of Billions, NPR (May 30,
2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/05/30/728122642/contract-buying-robbed-black-families-inchicago-of-billions [https://perma.cc/N4MK-62E5].
47
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rates,54 and title passing to the homeowner only when all the payments had
been made and all the contract conditions were met.55 The contract seller
held the deed and could seize the property if the buyer missed even a single
payment.56 Over the period of the contract, the buyer acquired no equity in
the home and was not protected by regulation of the practices.57
A 2019 report examining these practices concluded that between 75%
and 95% of African-American homeowners in Chicago during the 1950s and
1960s purchased their homes through these contracts.58 The price markup on
these homes was 84%, and African-Americans who entered into these
contracts “paid, on average, an additional $587 (in April 2019 dollars) more
each month” than if they had a conventional mortgage.59 These practices
made home ownership much riskier for African-Americans. Speculators
drained money from African-American communities, and neighborhoods,
where contract lending predominated, were subject to higher levels of
decline than other areas. 60 Discriminatory federal policies created the
conditions that allowed these predatory lending practices to occur, and the
lack of African-American political clout made it harder to fight the
discrimination and predation.61
3. The Financial Crisis, Race, and Disinvestment
The impact of redlining—and reverse redlining62—in the middle of the
twentieth century pales in comparison with the impact of the mid-2000s
housing bubble and the financial crisis that followed. Scholars have
characterized the financial crisis as “nothing short of the preeminent civil
rights issue of our time, erasing, as it has, a generation of hard fought wealth

54

Id.
David Dayen, African-Americans Are Still Being Victimized by the Mortgage Market, NEW REPUBLIC
(May 27, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117912/reparations-how-mortgage-market-hurts-african
-americans [https://perma.cc/8WYR-2YJS].
56
Id.
57
Moore, supra note 53.
58
THE SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY, DUKE UNIV., THE PLUNDER OF BLACK
WEALTH IN CHICAGO: NEW FINDINGS ON THE LASTING TOLL OF PREDATORY HOUSING CONTRACTS iii
(2019), https://socialequity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Plunder-of-Black-Wealth-in-Chicago
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y5W-ZDKF]; see also BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL
ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 4 (2009) (estimating the total of AfricanAmerican homeowners relying on contract loans at 85%).
59
THE SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY, supra note 58, at iii.
60
See Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54 GA. L. REV. 869, 904 (2020) (observing that such
neighborhoods quickly declined).
61
See id. at 900, 904.
62
Reverse redlining has been defined as “the practice of extending credit on unfair terms” to
communities that have been historically denied access to credit, predominantly on the basis of race.
Hargraves v. Cap. City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000).
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accumulation among African Americans.” 63 Between 2007 and 2013,
African-American college graduates lost an astounding 60% of their
accumulated equity, and Hispanic college graduates lost an even greater
amount.64 In comparison, White college graduates lost 16% during the same
period.65
The housing bubble and the financial crisis followed a period of
financial deregulation that fueled predatory lending practices.66 Legislative
changes in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated a shift from direct lending by
banks and thrifts to less regulated nonbank lenders through securitized
lending. 67 Banks that made direct loans and held the loans in their own
portfolios had incentives to secure loan value through underwriting practices
that appraised long term home value and guarded against the borrower’s
likelihood of default.68 The revenue of nonbank mortgage originators came
from “points, fees, origination charges and especially the size of the gap
between the prevailing interest rate index and the rate paid by borrowers,
commonly known as the ‘yield spread.’”69
This meant that the more loans brokers originated, the more money they
made. And the higher the fees, origination charges, and yield spread
premium that they could command, the higher their reported revenue. 70
63

Charles L. Nier, III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Theory of
Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941,
942 (2011).
64
William R. Emmons & Lowell R. Ricketts, College Is Not Enough: Higher Education Does Not
Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Wealth Gaps, 99 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 7, 17 (2017),
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/2017-02-15/college-is-not-enough-highereducation-does-not-eliminate-racial-and-ethnic-wealth-gaps.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SCH-X74E]; see
also Justin P. Steil, Len Albright, Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, The Social Structure of Mortgage
Discrimination, 33 HOUS. STUD. 759, 761 (2018) (“Even after controlling for available loan and
household characteristics, such as income, black home purchase borrowers were more than twice as likely
to receive a subprime loan as white borrowers and the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan actually
increased with household income, calling into question claims that subprime loans were given to riskier
borrowers.”).
65
Emmons & Ricketts, supra note 64, at 17 fig.6. Minority college graduates who might have
qualified for prime loans were targeted for unfavorable mortgage terms, contributing to loan defaults and
foreclosures that stripped them of the equity they had in their homes before the loans. See Carlos Garriga,
Lowell R. Ricketts & Don E. Schlagenhauf, The Homeownership Experience of Minorities During the
Great Recession, 99 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV 139, 148 (2017), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/
htdocs/publications/review/2017-02-15/the-homeownership-experience-of-minorities-during-the-greatrecession.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FZT-F6NX] (finding that delinquencies and foreclosures were much
higher for African-Americans and Latinos than for other groups).
66
See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 30 (updated ed. 2013).
67
Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis,
75 AM. SOCIO. REV. 629, 631–32 (2010); Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761.
68
Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 768.
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During the ‘90s, mortgage lenders had developed new models justifying
increased lending to borrowers with low credit scores. “Subprime loans”
made to borrowers with greater credit risk tended to come with higher fees
and interest rates, boosting the revenue for their originators. 71 A lender
focused on the long-term profitability of a loan portfolio would balance the
increased revenue from such loans against their increased risk and, indeed,
the traditional lenders who developed subprime loans reported only slightly
increased default rates from their portfolios.72 A lender, on the other hand,
who planned to sell the mortgages to others to be securitized or who simply
sought to maximize short-term revenue (and the bonuses for top executives)
would place greater weight on the additional up-front revenue and less on
long-term risk.73 The least-scrupulous lenders thus sought to grow rapidly,
emphasizing origination of the mortgages generating the greatest revenue
and fees, with little attention to loan quality—that is, the value of the
underlying collateral or the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.74 At the
height of the housing bubble of the mid-2000s, “the subprime market was
the Wild West. Over half the mortgage loans were made by independent
lenders without any federal supervision.”75
The housing bubble produced a sophisticated “Ponzi scheme.” 76
Individual brokers who initiated loans “received compensation based on the
volume of loans originated, rather than the quality of the loans made.”77 The
emphasis on quantity over quality led lenders to seek out the vulnerable,
unsophisticated, and politically powerless borrowers who could be
persuaded to take out loans that industry insiders referred to as “toxic.”78
The expanding army of loan brokers disproportionately found such
borrowers in minority communities. 79 Scholars observe, “[a]fter being
71

See Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 944–96.
Id. at 944; see also cummings, supra note 14, at 212 (noting that, for traditional lenders, the default
rates and percentages are significantly lower than the subprime loans written by independent mortgage
companies and are in line with typical default percentages expected with CRA subprime loans).
73
See Thomas Herndon, Liar’s Loans, Mortgage Fraud, and the Great Recession, 31 REV. POL.
ECON. 479, 482 (2020).
74
Id. at 479.
75
Paul Krugman, A Catastrophe Foretold, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/26/opinion/26krugman.html [https://perma.cc/7DDJ-3FG8].
76
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1008 (2009); see also June Carbone,
Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall Street Sniffed out Five Forgotten Factors
Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2012) (describing “the central factor in
a Ponzi scheme—the ability to earn large sums in the present through activities likely (or even certain) to
lead to the eventual failure of an enterprise”).
77
Carbone, supra note 76, at 1058.
78
Id. at 1054–55.
79
See Steil et al., supra note 64, at 769.
72
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denied credit for years these communities represented an untapped market
with established home equity and ample room for increased homeownership
populated by borrowers with little financial experience.” 80 AfricanAmerican and Latino borrowers remained “more likely than whites to be
turned down for a mortgage, even when controlling for income and home
location.” 81 Mortgage originators seeking to peddle nonprime loans on a
wholesale basis saw an opportunity.82
Nonprime loans grew dramatically, 83 driven by the mortgage
originators who often used predatory practices to pressure wary or
unsophisticated borrowers to take out loans on adverse terms. 84 Scholars
maintain that while predatory lending can be difficult to define, “the link
between predatory lending and subprime lending is clear”; the lenders
originating the most nonprime loans also are the most likely to engage in
abusive lending practices.85 These practices include (1) excessive fees and
interest rates given the nature of the loan and the borrower’s credit quality;
(2) “fraudulent, high-pressure, or misleading marketing”; and (3) high rates
of refinancing, including “flipping” one loan into another, often on onerous
terms, to avoid default.86
The results were particularly devastating for minority communities.87
The mortgage brokers were not trying to provide a service tailored to meet
borrower needs. Instead, they were seeking to peddle as many high revenue
loans as possible. 88 The predatory lenders who targeted vulnerable
communities often focused on well-off minority borrowers—borrowers who
might otherwise have qualified for more advantageous prime loans.89 As a
result of these practices, “low-risk African American borrowers were 65%
more likely than similar white borrowers to receive a subprime home80

Id. at 761.
Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 947.
82
Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761 (attributing the racially segmented practices to the “persistence
of high levels of racial segregation combined with structural changes in the lending industry”).
83
Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 944. For the purposes of this Essay, we use nonprime lending to
refer to higher-cost, higher-risk lending products that generate higher revenues for lenders.
84
Indeed, loan officers testified that they targeted minority communities because they believed that
they would be less savvy in evaluating nonprime loans with onerous terms. Steil et al., supra note 64, at
769.
85
Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 946.
86
Id. (quoting DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., TWO STEPS BACK: THE
DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
1, 8 (1999)).
87
See Rugh & Massey, supra note 67, at 632.
88
Id. at 630.
89
See Emma Coleman Jordan, The Hidden Structures of Inequality: The Federal Reserve and a
Cascade of Failures, 2 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 122 (2017) (explaining how “lenders encouraged
their mortgage brokers to sell more subprime loans by offering larger commissions” and that this
contributed to the targeting of minority neighborhoods underserved by more conventional lenders).
81
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purchase loan and 124% more likely to receive a subprime refinance loan.”90
By 2006, “roughly one out of every two loans made to African-American
(53%) and Latino (46%) borrowers were high-cost, compared to fewer than
one out of five loans made to white borrowers (18%).”91
Compounding the effect, roughly two-thirds of the subprime loans at
the height of the bubble were made to homeowners who already owned their
homes and were refinancing them, particularly in minority communities.92
In addition to charging higher fees and interest rates, some of these loans
offered “temporary low teaser rates, interest only mortgages, or mortgages
with 40 year payment terms that ballooned in later years.”93 Others involved
prepayment penalties that made it harder to refinance to avoid the jump in
monthly payments in later years.94 Yet, the lenders evaluated the borrower’s
ability to repay the loan based only on their ability to afford the initial “teaser
rate.”95
The combination of more expensive terms and the lack of rigorous
underwriting to determine the borrower’s ability to repay the loan made
foreclosure more likely. 96 Concentrated foreclosures, in turn, had a
devastating impact on minority neighborhoods, affecting local property
values (even in homes that did not experience foreclosure); serving as a
magnet for crime, particularly when property remained vacant for an
extended period; and undermining the property tax base needed to support
local schools and services. 97 Entire communities became burdened with
increased debt, reducing the assets available for other investments and
contributing to neighborhood devaluation.98
Ramirez and Williams conclude that the financial crisis “contributed to
the greatest upward transfer of wealth in modern American history.”99 In part
because of falling home values, African-American households experienced
90

Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 949.
Steil et al., supra note 64, at 761.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 766.
94
See McGlawn v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 891 A.2d 757, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (describing
onerous lending practices and fraud).
95
Steil et al., supra note 64, at 766.
96
Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948.
97
See Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948 n.56 (quoting CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL.,
PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS OF HIGHER COST HOME
PURCHASE LENDING 1 (2007)). By 2017, White homeowners at all income levels showed at least some
appreciation in property while African-Americans at all income levels continued to show home values
below 2006 levels. Michela Zonta, Racial Disparities in Home Appreciation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(July 15, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/15/
469838/racial-disparities-home-appreciation [https://perma.cc/HC2C-TWB4].
98
Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948.
99
Steven A. Ramirez & Neil G. Williams, Deracialization and Democracy, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L.
REV. 81, 99 (2019).
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a 53% decline in net worth during the financial crisis.100 Hispanic households
experienced a 66% decline.101 Meanwhile, White household wealth declined
by only 16%.102
African-American and Latino homeowners were targeted because they
were vulnerable.103 Yet in the aftermath of the financial crisis, conservative
commentators tried to shift the blame to government policies that encouraged
expansion of lending to previously excluded groups104 or to the borrowers
themselves for borrowing more than they could afford.105 The purpose of
many of these efforts was to block regulatory reform and governmentsponsored relief for the homeowners. 106 Law professors Janis Sarra and
Cheryl Wade describe any reforms to help the homeowners as “pathetically
weak,” and “the actual relief given to families suffering the devastating
effects of the meltdown [as] woefully inadequate.” 107 The relief to
homeowners paled in comparison with the Wall Street bailouts that kept the
major financial institutions that had profited from the practices afloat.108 It
also undermined the financial base of many minority communities, as
property values remained depressed and homeowners’ debt burden
increased.109 The overall result is that the long-standing racial disparities in
home ownership worsened not only during the financial crisis but in the

100

Jordan, supra note 89, at 112.
Id.
102
Id.
103
See, e.g., Swan, supra note 60, at 879–82 (describing the role of redlining and reverse redlining
in explaining vulnerability during the financial crisis); Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an
Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. STATE U.L. REV. 313, 316 (2015) (alterations and emphasis in original)
(quoting M&T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 576 (2010)) (describing a “jury might well
conclude that [the borrowers] were targeted not on the basis of being African-American, but because they
were vulnerable, low-income, unsophisticated, first-time home buyers who happened to be AfricanAmerican” even if it cannot be determined that they were targeted because of their race).
104
PETER J. WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE WORLD’S WORST
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN 218 (2016).
105
See, e.g., cummings, supra note 14, at 205 (explaining the “dirty little myth” that minority
borrowers were to blame for the housing crisis); cf. Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1570 (2016) (observing that the consensus view is that the housing bubble
was fueled by supply side demand (the desire of the lenders to originate more mortgages) rather than
greater borrower demand).
106
See, e.g., Natalie Goodnow, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight’: A Q&A with Peter Wallison on the 2008
Financial Crisis and Why It Might Happen Again, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.aei.org/
economics/hidden-plain-sight-qa-peter-wallison-2008-financial-crisis-might-happen [https://perma.cc/
NZK2-TRTX] (explaining that the result was to get the government out of the housing market entirely).
107
SARRA & WADE, supra note 39, at 1–2.
108
See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1371 (2011) (stating that Congress authorized bailouts of $700 billion
for Wall Street through the Trouble Asset Relief Program); see also Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. For a comprehensive view, see generally Xiaoxi Liu,
The Costs of Bailouts in the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 417 (2017).
109
Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 63, at 948.
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postrecession recovery.110 African-American college graduates lost the most
ground as they became even less likely than White college graduates to own
their own homes than they had been before the Crisis.111 Wade and Serra
conclude that the “progress of blacks into the middle class that started in the
mid twentieth century not only stopped after 2008, but also declined
significantly.”112
B. Higher Education
The second traditional pathway into middle-class status and greater
political clout is education—particularly higher education. Thomas Jefferson
viewed education much the same way he did property ownership: as
facilitating the independent thought necessary for democratic selfgovernment.113 California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu argues that
education is a central component of the concept of equal citizenship, both
historically and today.114 Yet, both historically and today, this pathway has
been more perilous for African-Americans.
African-Americans were excluded from education during slavery.
Slave owners believed that education would undermine slavery because “if
slaves were permitted to learn to read and write the English language, they
could begin to think and act on their own and rebellion was inevitable.”115
South Carolina became the first Southern state to pass prohibitions on
educating enslaved African-Americans in 1740, 116 and most of the other
slave states followed suit.117 With Emancipation, African-Americans slowly
gained access to public education as the South put in place comprehensive
public school systems for the first time.118 However, in contrast with the rest

110
Christopher Famighetti & Darrick Hamilton, The Great Recession, Education, Race, and
Homeownership, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 15, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/the-greatrecession-education-race-and-homeownership [https://perma.cc/LKS9-P42K].
111
Id.
112
SARRA & WADE, supra note 39, at xv.
113
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, supra note 28, at 98.
114
See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 342, 344
(2006) (“[C]itizenship implicates not only the civic republican values of political participation and
democratic self-governance, but also the ethical values of mutual respect, personal responsibility, and
equal dignity.”).
115
Monique Langhorne, The African American Community: Circumventing the Compulsory
Education System, 33 BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 12, 13 (2000).
116
Id.
117
See Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPP.
L. REV. 49, 67 (2011) (stating that “[m]ost of the slave states made it a crime to educate any blacks, slave
or free”).
118
See STANLEY LIEBERSON, A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACKS AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1880, at
134 (1980).
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of the country, none of the Southern states had well-developed public school
systems in 1870—for Whites or African-Americans.119
Meanwhile, by the middle of the twentieth century, university
education expanded and became more critical to individual advancement. At
the beginning of this expansion, public colleges and universities were
relatively affordable.120 But since the end of the 1980s, public funding of
university education has declined as a percentage of total cost121 as tuition
has increased substantially. 122 Student borrowing has made up the
difference.123
Since Emancipation, African-Americans have sought the same
educational opportunities as other Americans.124 Yet they have received less
access to affordable, good-quality education, and pervasive discrimination
has made the payoff from their investments less than that for Whites with
comparable degrees. 125 The Great Recession exacerbated all of these
conditions and set the stage for a new round of predatory practices with
familiar racially disparate effects.
Four facts help to contextualize these predatory practices, especially
during times of financial crises. First, financial downturns are often seen as
a good time to stay in school and disproportionately affect AfricanAmericans. 126 Second and relatedly, an additional degree can be seen as

119
See Liu, supra note 114, at 388, 391 (stating that, in the 1880s, the tax base in the Northeast, with
high school enrollment levels and low illiteracy, was four times the base in “the South, where enrollment
rates were low and illiteracy rates high”).
120
Public institutions and funding reached their height in the postwar era, and the percentage of
students attending public colleges and universities increased from one in five at the beginning of the
twentieth century to two in three by the beginning of the twenty-first century. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN &
LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 130, 266 (2008).
121
See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION:
A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 71–72, 71 fig.20 (Thomas D. Snyder ed., 1993); Jonathan D. Glater, Student
Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561, 1577 (2015).
122
John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education,
104 GEO. L.J. 229, 239 (2016). The increases have been particularly steep at public universities compared
with the increase at private, nonprofit institutions. Glater, supra note 121, at 1573.
123
Brooks, supra note 122, at 248–51. Brooks reports, “In the 1975–1976 academic year, total federal
grants were four times the volume of federal loans, but by 1981–1982, loans became a greater share of
federal funding, and by 2012 the volume of federal grants was about half the volume of federal loans.”
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
124
See, e.g., Herman N. Johnson Jr., From Status to Agency: Abolishing the “Very Spirit of Slavery,”
7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 245, 262 (2017) (observing that “freed Black persons valued education as a
central tenet of freedom, and this value reflected the desire for autonomy and self-improvement they
believed to be so indicative of freedom”).
125
See Emmons & Ricketts, supra note 64, at 32–33.
126
See SCOTT-CLAYTON & LI, supra note 12, at 5 (indicating that higher African-American graduate
enrollment rates may reflect higher unemployment rates as “the Great Recession hit black college
graduates much harder than white college graduates,” and evidence indicates that “employers are more
likely to discriminate against minorities in weak labor markets”).
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essential to gain employment in a tight labor market. 127 Third, absent
increased federal expenditures, financial downturns undercut state tax bases,
undermining support for public education. 128 This can make public
universities more expensive as they raise tuition to compensate.129 Fourth,
the decline in income and asset values made it harder for parents to contribute
to their children’s education, increasing reliance on student loans.130
During the financial crisis, for-profit universities were poised to take
advantage of these circumstances to engage in predatory lending practices.
Their expansion depended on the existence of federal loan guarantees
without appropriate oversight of the institutions profiting from the loans.131
In 1965, Congress passed legislation to encourage greater student lending.132
Student borrowers, who typically have no income, assets, or credit history,
are thus poor credit risks for traditional loans. 133 By guaranteeing loan
repayment, the federal government encouraged private lenders to extend
credit at lower rates.134 In 2005, Congress substantially increased the amount
students—especially graduate students—could borrow. 135 Congress also
passed legislation limiting the ability to discharge student loans in
bankruptcy—a boon to creditors—and expanding the loan programs.136
As a result, student borrowing dramatically increased, with AfricanAmericans seeing the largest overall increases.137 Between 1993 and 2008,
average individual student loan debt rose substantially, tripling for Latinos,

127
Brooks, supra note 122, at 237. This has been particularly true for African-American women, who
are more likely to be in fields such as education or health care where additional degrees are important to
advancement. African-American enrollment in masters programs doubled between 1996 and 2016, with
women leading the way. Nikki Katz, Black Women Are the Most Educated Group in the U.S.,
THOUGHTCO (June 20, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/black-women-most-educated-group-us-404
8763 [https://perma.cc/K5SN-PXYV].
128
Brooks, supra note 122, at 246.
129
Id.
130
Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/educationpostsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federal-data-showstudent-loan-crisis-african-americanborrowers [https://perma.cc/SCH6-HWPC].
131
See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Forgotten Stewards of Higher Education Quality, 11 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 12 (2020).
132
20 U.S.C. § 1071; see also Timothy D. Naegele, The Guaranteed Student Loan Program: Do
Lenders’ Risks Exceed Their Rewards?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 599 (1983).
133
Naegele, supra note 132, at 603 n.23.
134
Id. at 601 (noting that although the Act was originally designed to benefit low-income borrowers,
it was eventually extended to all student borrowers).
135
The Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 (HERA 2005) greatly increased federal
borrowing limits, particularly for graduate students. C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt
and the Future of Higher Education, 34 J. COLL. & U.L. 79, 91 (2007).
136
Brooks, supra note 122, at 249 (calling this legislation “essentially an additional subsidy to
lenders”).
137
See SCOTT-CLAYTON & LI, supra note 12, at 2.
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quadrupling for Whites, and rising almost sixfold for African-Americans.138
Graduate borrowing accounted for a significant share of the differences.139
The most startling finding, however, was that this increased AfricanAmerican graduate enrollment was concentrated in for-profit institutions,
accounting for more than a quarter (28%) of African-American graduate
enrollment in comparison with only 9% for Whites in 2012.140
The growth of African-American enrollment in for-profit institutions is
recent. In 2004, for-profit institutions enrolled less than seven percent of the
students in any racial group.141 Yet by 2008, around a quarter of AfricanAmerican graduates were enrolled in for-profit institutions.142 This growth
has had a major impact on the student loan picture, particularly for AfricanAmericans.
First, the level of borrowing at for-profit institutions is higher than at
other educational institutions. At all institutions, African-Americans already
borrow more than other students. 143 At for-profit institutions, students
generally are more dependent on student loans, with 95% of AfricanAmericans at these institutions taking out loans.144
Second, the benefit from attending a for-profit institution is less than
what students at other institutions receive for their degree. Five years after
entering these for-profit programs, students are less likely to be employed or
satisfied with their course of study than students attending public or private
nonprofit schools.145
Third, given these factors, it is unsurprising that African-Americans
have higher default rates than other borrowers146 and that student defaults in
repaying loans at for-profit institutions are vastly higher than at other
educational institutions.147 These effects reinforce each other. For example,
“only 4 percent of white graduates who never attended a for-profit defaulted
within 12 years of entry, compared to 67 percent of black dropouts who ever
attended a for-profit.”148
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Fourth, about a quarter of the racial gap in student loan debt reflects
differences in rates of repayment and interest accrual, 149 further
compounding the impact of student debt. African-Americans are much more
likely than Whites (48% compared with 17%) to have interest accumulate
faster than repayments, increasing their debt loads after graduation.150 For
African-Americans, the rates are at “crisis levels” and continuing to rise.151
While some for-profit institutions perform a useful service by training
students, for example, in health care and technology,152 others enrich their
executives at the expense of their students. 153 The growth of for-profit
education institutions—like the growth of unregulated mortgage lenders—
reflected market-oriented neoliberal ideology.154 As Congress cut back on
grants, it expanded the availability of federally guaranteed loans and
seemingly treated the growth of for-profit institutions as evidence of the
wisdom of the market.155 Yet, increasing the availability of federal student
loan guarantees without increasing supervision of the quality of educational
institutions creates what economists call a “moral hazard.” 156 Of higher
education institutions eligible to receive federal financial aid under Title IV
of the Higher Education Act, 42.9% were for-profit institutions in academic
year 2016–2017.157 Deriving up to 90% of their revenue from federal aid
programs,158 these for-profit institutions had incentives to enroll as many
students as possible.159 With each student enrolled, the college or university
149
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would receive the federal guaranteed loans up front, ensuring that the
institution would profit whether or not the student ever repaid the loans and
whether or not they graduated.160
The obvious response to this type of asymmetric risk is oversight of the
institutions. Indeed, the federal government requires accreditation for
eligibility to participate in the federal guarantee loan program. 161 Yet,
oversight has been lax,162 and under former Secretary of Education Betsy
DeVos, the Department of Education has rolled back Obama-era measures
designed to strengthen oversight.163
The incentives to grow—and to spend as little as possible educating
students164—led to the use of aggressive marketing campaigns designed to
find students who were willing to take out the loans necessary to pay the
relatively high tuition at these institutions.165 A 2012 Senate investigation,
for example, found that for-profit institutions spend hundreds of millions of
dollars a year on marketing, often more than they spend on instruction.166
For-profit institutions average $400 in advertising per student in comparison
with public institutions that average $14 per student. 167 The advertising
typically targets the vulnerable: veterans, single parents, low-income, and
minority students. 168 The schools have been accused of misrepresenting
costs,169 using high-pressure sales tactics,170 admitting students who have not
graduated from high school, and “misleading students about classes and
programs in order to secure enrollment.” 171 For-profit schools claim,
however, that they are more likely to meet students “where they are,”
offering more flexible scheduling to accommodate students who are working
160
See id. (“[T]he schools themselves get paid upfront and do not suffer any consequences of a
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161
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or caring for children. 172 Predatory recruiting—including the deliberate
targeting of prospective African-American students—contributes to the
racial disparities in enrollment. 173 The lesser emphasis on entering
credentials and the lesser available support services, not to mention closures
and outright fraud, contribute to lower completion rates.174
The responses to the growth in minority student loan debt have been
twofold. First, just as the financial crisis led to critics questioning the value
of home ownership, so has the growth in student debt led to renewed
questioning of the value of a college education. Crippling debt is given as a
major reason for questioning the value of a college degree,175 and indeed, the
payoff is lowest for those snookered into attending poor-quality for-profit
schools. 176 As a result, since 2010, overall African-American college
enrollment has fallen. 177 The second response has been to increase the
pressure for across-the-board student debt forgiveness. 178 The critical
question going forward, student debt forgiveness or not, is what role
education plays as a pathway into the middle class.
The COVID-19 pandemic, together with the Trump Administration’s
weakening of regulatory oversight, has raised the specter of a new wave of
unnecessary debt.179 Enrollment in for-profit institutions is again on the rise,
corresponding with substantial drops in community college attendance.180
Particularly concerning is the increased attendance of first-time college
students enrolling at for-profit colleges right out of high school.181 Creating
second-class private institutions to address the unmet need for postsecondary
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education simply invites fraud—fraud that further undermines the basis for
full citizenship and strong communities.
C. Marriage
Marriage has also been foundational for entering into the middle class
and marshalling the resources for investment in the next generation. 182
Extensive commentary addresses the decline in marriage and its
disproportionate impact on African-Americans. 183 What has received less
commentary is the impact of debt and financial instability on family
relationships. Financial reserves and family instability almost certainly
interact, increasing the impact of the predatory lending practices.
Entering into the right marriage has long been considered necessary to
assemble the resources required for investment in children. Historian
Stephanie Coontz maintains that for thousands of years, marriage served as
a “way of raising capital, constructing political alliances, organizing the
division of labor by age and gender,” and ordering the relationship between
children and their parents. 184 Marriage served as the principal means “of
transferring property, occupational status, personal contacts, money, tools,
livestock and women across generations and kin groups.”185
Sociologist Orlando Patterson claims that modern marriages continue
to constitute a form of social dowry that increases the links to richer and
more powerful parts of society. 186 African-Americans are thus at a
disadvantage given their lower marriage rates187 and are the least likely to
marry outside of their immediate ethnic and social group.188 Patterson further
argues that alternatives to marriage such as cohabitation are even more
fragile than marriage.189 That in itself diminishes the resources available to
182
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the next generation and makes entry into the middle class more difficult.190
The problem arises not just from the lack of marriage per se, but also from
the lessened ability to construct the alliances that encourage investment in
the pathways to middle-class status.191 More recent data indicates that the
fragility of African-American relationships have only worsened in the
decades since Patterson wrote.192
Why African-American family ties are more fragile involves a long and
complex history. 193 As the preconditions for stable relationships have
become harder to meet, however, three factors in the modern era undermine
not just marriage, but also relationship stability outside of marriage.
The first is the impact of racism on African-American men. In their
introduction to a 2009 retrospective on the inflammatory 1965 Moynihan
Report on the African-American family, sociologists Douglas Massey and
Robert Sampson observe that “Moynihan’s core argument was really rather
simple: whenever males in any population subgroup lack widespread access
to reliable jobs, decent earnings, and key forms of socially rewarded status,
single parenthood will increase, with negative side effects on women and
children.”194 The inability to secure the pathways into middle-class status
continues to disproportionately affect African-American men with
reinforcing effects on African-American family stability.195
The second is the “mismatch” between African-American men and
women. Sociologists maintain that in societies where women outnumber
men, marriage declines and women invest more in their own resources,
networks, and earning capacity. 196 Among African-Americans, gender
disparities increase over time, as African-American male death rates outpace
those of the women.197 The high incarceration rates of African-American
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males exacerbate the ratios further. 198 Educational differences further
separate African-American men and women. A 2007 report found that only
46% of African-American boys graduated from high school in comparison
with 60% of girls. 199 The disparities in college graduation rates are even
greater, with twice as many African-American women as men graduating
from college. 200 In some African-American communities, marriageable
women outnumber marriageable men by two-to-one.201
The third and final factor is gender distrust. As intimate relationships
have become more egalitarian, they depend to a greater degree on shared
expectations about committed relationships.202 Yet, when women outnumber
men in a given marriage market, that trust tends to decline.203 And when men
and women in a given culture have different expectations about intimate
relationships, the foundation for long-term commitment is harder to
establish.204 Differences in the sex-role ideologies of African-American men
and women tend to be larger than for other groups.205
These three factors result in patterns of family formation in AfricanAmerican communities different from White communities. In 2018, for
example, 39.6% of births in the United States were nonmarital, with AfricanAmericans (69.4%), Native Americans (68.2%), and Hispanics (51.8%)
having the highest rates. 206 Moreover, births to “solo” mothers, who are
neither married nor cohabitating, constitute almost half of African-American
births, in contrast with 9% of births to Whites and 16% of births to Latinas.207
And African-American marriages are substantially more likely than White
198
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marriages to end in divorce in most age groups.208 Moreover, for AfricanAmericans, higher levels of education and income have less of a protective
effect. African-American women with bachelor’s degrees are less likely to
marry and stay married than other college graduates.209
The interaction between family structure and economic vulnerability
increases the importance of a financial cushion before marriage.210 Marriage
itself tends to be associated with higher levels of these resources whether
from savings, homeownership, or parental contributions.211 Those without
such safety nets have a harder time recovering financially from illnesses,
unemployment, and unexpected expenses.212 In today’s marriage markets,
therefore, it is not surprising that “both women’s and men’s earnings are
positively associated with marriage and that the positive association between
women’s earnings and marriage has been increasing over time.”213
In the absence of such reserves, commitment to a partner who may need
support is a risky proposition. Many individuals are reluctant to commit to a
partner who is not financially stable for fear that the relationship will deplete
their own resources. 214 Economic insecurity accordingly increases family
instability. For example, going through a foreclosure makes it more likely
that a married couple will divorce.215 The same goes for student loan debt.
One study found that “13% of divorcees blame student loans specifically
for ending their marriage,” and a larger number suggested that such debt
contributed to tensions.216
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All these factors disproportionately affect African-Americans.217 They
also increase the attractiveness of student loans, at least from the perspective
of African-American women. African-American women, who are more
likely than White women to believe that they will need to rely on their own
resources, see additional education as critical to their advancement in
employment.218 Yet, as shown above, increased debt may further undermine
and destabilize relationship commitment.
Together, these trends magnify the racial wealth gap.219 For AfricanAmericans, the lack of access to marriage has compounded social, economic,
and political marginalization. And the lack of a greater financial cushion
undermines marriage.
CONCLUSION
As the United States has dismantled the protections that fueled stable
prosperity in the middle of the twentieth century, the pathways into the
middle class have become more perilous. Those perils have become
particularly treacherous for African-Americans. Home ownership, higher
education, and marriage remain important sources of full citizenship,
political clout, and advancement for most; yet, the security that such
investments traditionally provided has become harder to achieve. This has
occurred in part because the nature of the American political system has
changed with the country’s changing demographics, including greater
inequality and greater diversity. Instead of shared prosperity, Americans are
experiencing increasing inequality. These changes came to a head in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. While Whites have largely recovered,
the financial crisis destroyed a stunning percentage of African-American
wealth, which remains unrecovered due to a dramatically slower recovery in
both housing values and income potential relative to White communities.
The result undermines political as well as economic equality, threatening the
prosperity of what has been the most upwardly mobile parts of minority
communities and discouraging future investment.
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